










Coping with Heterogeneities in the 









Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu reported in the October 2001 issue of the Economic 
Journal that a cut in the unemployment insurance replacement rate from 80 to 75 
percent caused a 10 percent increase in the job finding rate. They also identify an 
anticipatory reform effect up to five months before the reform. Implied elasticity at 
1,6 is high compared to previous research in Sweden and elsewhere. After analysing 
their data for various heterogeneities, we conclude that the estimated coefficients 
designed to capture the reform and the anticipatory effects are statistical artefacts. 
The standard statistical tests and analytic procedures used by CHV do not warn for 
this eventuality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In April 1995 the Swedish Government announced a reform package to 
tackle the budget deficit. Among the measures taken, was a cut in the 
replacement rate of the unemployment insurance from 80 to 75 percent, 
effective as of January 1, 1996. Kenneth Carling, Bertil Holmlund and 
Altin Vejsiu (CHV) report in the Economic Journal (vol 111, No 474) that 
the cut caused a 10 percent increase in the job finding rate among the 
insured, implying an elasticity as high as 1,6 per cent. They also report that 
the reform began to affect the behavior of the unemployed already several 
months before its actual implementation in January 1996. Could such a 
small change, economically trivial to most affected households, cause such 
changes in behavior among the unemployed? 
In this paper we analyze the CHV data, successfully replicating their 
models.
1 We highlight the fundamental heterogeneity of labour markets and 
labour market behavior that is hidden in their concept of “transition to 
regular jobs”. Their statistical design focusing on the quasi-experimental 
difference-in-differences does not cope effectively with this heterogeneity. 
Their finding of a ten per cent jump in job findings turns out to be a 
statistical artifact resulting from these heterogeneities. Their finding of 
statistically significant coefficients for the “reform effect” several months 
before the reform is actually an indication that the coefficient has nothing 
to do with the reform.  
 
 
2. Replicating the CHV models 
 
Using the data obtained from CHV we were able to reproduce the sample 
characteristics in their Table 1 for the variables in our model, the 
distribution of replacement rates before 1996 in their Table 2 and the 
distribution of durations in their Table 3 with trivial differences only. 
Our model estimates are reported in tables A1 and A2 in the appendix as 
obtained for the Cox proportional hazards model and according partial 
likelihood estimation (the PHREG procedure in SAS). Our reform effect is 
a bit higher, 0.15, compared to 0.12 in CHV. As alternatives, which are 
 
1 We have presented our reanalysis of the CBV study of the 1996 change in the 
compensation level in Johansson & Selen (2000). In Johansson & Selén (2001) we 
study the 1993 cut in benefits from 90 to 80 percent using a similar design, statistical 
method and type of administrative data. We find heterogeneity causing the same type of 




                                                          
closer to the specification of CHV, a piecewise constant exponential 
model as well as a model in discrete time with a baseline hazard estimated 
for time periods of four weeks have been estimated with the help of TDA.
2  
The differences between the estimates of the reform effect in our three 
alternatives are negligible. 
The choice of explanatory variables in our model is equal to the third 
model of CHV. With few exceptions, estimates are close to their estimates 
for the combined exit codes (column 3, Table 4). The notable exception is 
that the labour market indicator, the local unemployment rate by month, is 
important according to our estimation. Our coefficient is –3.39 and strongly 
significant, while CHV obtained -.694 with a standard error of 0.399. Their 
anomalous result that the local unemployment rate has no effect on the job 
finding rate intrigued us. Searching for specifications that might replicate 
their result, an estimate of about the same size -.65 was obtained when the 
unemployment rate was fixed in time (instead of time variant) and equal to 
the rate of the last month in the unemployment period. 
Larger differences in estimating effects are obtained for the procedure 
used for examining anticipation effects by CHV. We have not been able to 
explain those differences. 
 
 
3. The hidden heterogeneity of “regular 
jobs” 
 
Administrative records many times provide excellent data for research 
particularly when they contain data on economic transactions, which are 
controlled and audited as are the sums paid for the unemployment 
insurance. However, administrative definitions are just that and must be 
checked against the theoretical concepts before they are used in research. 
CHV imply that their “transitions to work” from unemployment are 
transitions to “regular jobs”. However, they merge four administrative 
codes used by the labor exchange offices for “regular jobs” with a  “code 
11” for “Other transitions to work”. This code brings together a variety of 
other codes that are not really “regular” jobs:  
 
21 = transition to part-time unemployment with the insurance compensating to full time;  
31 = transition to (very) temporary work;  
41 = transition to employment for disabled with a wage subsidy;  
42 = transition to public sheltered employment.  
 
 
2 See Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995). 
2  
 These “11-coded” individuals constitute no less than 40 per cent of all 
transitions to work and are, as we shall see, crucially important for the 
reform effect to appear. If this category is not classified among the 




4. The heterogeneity of labour markets and 
behaviour  
 
The five main codes differentiate very different categories of unemployed 
that have been differently affected by the changes in the labour market 
during the years before and after the reform. Gender and age are pertinent 
to labour market behaviour. This is documented in Table 1 with estimates 
for transitions to work by control variables, which are excerpted from the 
full model in Table A1 in the appendix.  
In column 1 we compare differences in transition rates in the after 
period with the before period for the different exit codes. There are much 
fewer transitions to “regular permanent jobs” among the unemployed in the 
sample after the reform was effective from January 1, 1996 according to 
the estimate (–.430) in column 1. This seems to be true also for the “6-
coded” (-.364), who presumably found jobs on their own. The chances for 
regular temporary employment did not decline, nor the chances to be reem 
 
Table 1. Estimates for control variables in separate models for 
each of the registered transitions to ”work” included as 
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*** 01 level significant, ** 05 level significant. For number of transitions see Table 2. 
 
3  
 ployed by the previous employer. The coefficients are not statistically 
significant but also very low (-.021 and -.079 respectively). Other tran-
sitions to “work” (code 11) increased after the reform (+.184).  
The next two columns document the fairly sizable differences between 
the two treatment groups in comparisons with the control group for the 
different exit codes. The T1-group includes the unemployed who were 
exposed to the full impact of the 5-percentage point benefit cut and the T2-
group the unemployed, who were affected but by less than 5-percent cuts. 
From CHV and our reanalysis we know that the T1-group consists mainly 
of lower paid women laid off from primarily public sector work and that 
the control group consists mainly of higher paid men with incomes above 
the ceiling in the unemployment insurance and are mainly from the private 
sector. The T1-group much less often found regular permanent jobs than 
the control group (-.366) but made other transitions to “work” more often 
(+.180). 
In the gender column we see that women throughout the period had slim 
chances, in comparison to men, of getting regular permanent employment 
(-.650), regular temporary employment (-.547), being re-employed by their 
previous employer (-1.183) or finding a job on their own (-.454), while 
their chances of ending up in other transitions to “work” were far greater 
than that of men (+.355). Finally, age does not appear to be an asset when it 
comes to finding employment. 
The last row in Table 1 shows the coefficients from the model with 
merged exit codes, in which the fundamental heterogeneity of labour 
markets and labour market behaviour is hidden. 
 
 
5. The non-effect of benefit change 
 
The columns in tables A1 and A2 show estimates for different exit codes 
treating episodes with other codes as right-censored. Thus each analysis is 
conditional on the individuals being precluded from the different alterna-
tive exits. While an elimination of possible exits in reality will probably 
affect the behavior of individuals, the purpose of the exercise here is to 
examine the effects on the result of gradually considering other exits than 
“regular permanent jobs”.  In Table 2 we report the coefficients for the 
reform effect together with the p-values of the estimates excerpted from 
tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. Recall that the coefficient measures the 
difference-in-differences in job finding rate before and after January 1, 
1996 between the two treatment groups combined and the control group.  
 
4  
 Table 2. Estimated reform effect in separate models for each of 
the registered transitions to ”work” included as ”regular employ-
ment” by CHV-team. 
 
Code  Type of transition from 
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Note first that the coefficients for the “reform effect” for the five separate 
types of transitions have different signs and none is even close to statistical 
significance! However, when we run a model with all five  “transitions to 
work” categories combined, we get a coefficient for the “reform effect” 
that has the correct estimated sign, i.e. positive and significant at the one 
per cent level.  
When we remove code 11 from the combined transition categories, there 
is no statistically significant reform effect. Removing them would be for 
substantive reasons. Code 11 does not really represent “transitions to 
regular jobs” but for the most part to labour market programs. The benefit 
cut did not increase transitions to regular jobs. 
Note next that there is no reform effect for those in code 11 when 
modelled separately. It is the combination of code 1 and 11 that produces 
the significant coefficient for the “reform effect”. The two codes represent 
totally different categories in terms of demographic and socio-economic 
composition and labour market situations. The statistically significant 
coefficient that appears when these different categories are merged, has 
nothing to do with the reform but appears because of the merging of the 
two very different categories in terms of labour market situation.  
We conclude that the coefficient reported by CHV, is a statistical artifact 





                                                          
6. The anticipatory effect 
 
Our conclusion that the estimated coefficient for the reform effect is a 
statistical artefact is further supported when we analyse the anticipatory 
effect that CHV have identified. 
CHV provide a neat theoretical explanation for an anticipatory effect. A 
cut in the compensation rate theoretically functions as an insurance system 
with two compensation levels, an initially high level followed by a lower 
level after some period of unemployment. The optimal adaptation to such a 
system for the unemployed is to let the reservation wage go down until the 
reform is implemented after which the reservation wage is constant. The 
job finding rate thus increases until the reform goes into effect and is 
constant after that. 
CHV are aware of one objection; how one can logically have both an 
anticipatory effect and simultaneously a reform effect when comparing 
before and after. They provide a brief answer to this objection that it is 
possible that the “before/after” effect (with an already high elasticity of 
1.6) is an underestimate (!) of the true effect.
3 Let us now take a closer look 
at their method of measuring the anticipatory effect. 
 
Figure 1. Simple reform effect         Figur 2. Reform effect with anti- 
immediately after reform imple-     cipatory effekt and thinning effect 
mentation. 
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3  The implied elasticity of 1.6 is well above the range of 0.2-0.9 that Layard et al 
(1991) established in previous studies internationally. In Carling (1996) two of the same 
authors reported elasticity as low as –0,06 for the compensation level for Sweden. The 
0,6 elasticity (not quite statistically significant) that Harkman (1997) found in his study 
of the 1993 cut of the compensation level from 90 to 80 percent is not put into the 
context of “Swedish evidence in the 90.s”.  
6  
 In  Figure 1 the line ABC illustrates the job finding rate at a given 
compensation level in unemployment insurance. At B the compensation 
level is lowered, increasing the job finding rate by x per cent up to the line 
DE. This increase is identified as the reform effect in a simple model 
without an anticipatory effect. 
The anticipatory effect in the CHV paper is measured by moving the 
reform backwards in time from January 1 four weeks at a time. This 
method means, however, that there is a gradual thinning of the reform 
effect not noted by CHV.  
The reform effect is an average difference of change in unemployment 
duration between the after-period and the before-period. The after-period 
average difference-in-differences is made successively thinner when it is 
mixed with the before-period as the reform is successively moved back in 
time. In Figure 2 the drawn line AD represents the successive “dilution” of 
the reform effect that comes about when the reform is moved backwards. If 
there is an anticipatory effect, it should come out similar to the dotted line 
above the drawn line.  
For an anticipatory effect to be statistically significant the difference 
between the dotted line and the drawn line must be much larger and more 
systematic than is documented by CHV. Their claim to have identified a 
statistically significant anticipatory effect is mistaken because they neglect 
the “dilution” effect! 
 
 
Figure 3. The coefficient for the ”reform effect” when the 
reform is successively moved backwards in time with our 
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 When we now turn to real data as reported by CHV in their Figure 6 we 
find our estimates to be rather different from theirs. In our Figure 3 we 
have extended the simulated alternative reforms backwards by 60 weeks. 
Both the CHV curve and our curve illustrate statistically significant 
coefficients at several points in time before the reform was implemented. 
This is more pronounced in our estimates than in the CHV estimates.  
The first significant coefficient estimated by CHV is for August 1995, 
five months before the reform is implemented. We estimate significant 
coefficients for the reform effect even for June and May before the reform 
bill was passed in Parliament but one month after it was announced in 
April. The fatal blow to CHV’s interpretation of these coefficients as 
indications of anticipatory adaptations to the benefit cut (let alone the 
dilution effect) is that we estimate significant coefficients for DPOL also 
56 and 60 weeks prior to the reform. This would actually be long before the 






So far we have proved that the conclusions drawn by CHV that the 1996 
benefit cut in the Swedish unemployment insurance caused a 10 per cent 
increase in job findings and anticipatory behavioral changes before the 
reform do not hold. In the process we have shown how their statistical 
design can produce artifacts, i. e. false positive results as to reform effects. 
The standard statistical tests and analytic procedures used by CHV do not 
warn for this eventuality.  
We do not claim to have proved a negative result beyond doubt; i. e. that 
the benefit cut did not boost job findings among the unemployed. We have 
not attempted to exclude the possibility that some other statistical design 
could provide evidence for a labour supply effect among unemployed of 
small changes in the unemployment insurance.      
However, there are at least two straightforward reasons to doubt that it is 
possible to find a labour supply effect of the 1996 Swedish reform; (1) the 
change was economically trivial to most of the affected individuals and 
households, and (2) the reform was implemented in an employer’s market 
with over 10 percent of the labour force out of work. 
From tax reform studies we know that the labor supply response to even 
huge cuts in the income tax rates is surprisingly weak for a variety of 
8  
 
                                                          
reasons
4. In this case a 5-percentage cut in the fairly generous benefit level 
is supposed to have caused the job finding rate among those effected to 
jump substantially by affecting search intensity and reservation wages. One 
should note that a third of the benefit cut is counteracted by lower taxes in 
the Swedish system. The bite of the cut is further reduced by increases in 
income related housing allowances and reductions in day care costs for 
families when insurance income is reduced.
5  It is not clear why the 
response would be even noticeable when a £40 daily after-tax benefit is cut 
to £39. The way to proving/disproving an effect may not go via a more 
sophisticated statistical design for the difference-in-difference approach but 
by evidence that substantiate the changes in search intensity and 
reservation wages that is theoretically assumed in search theory.  
However, even if this small change in benefit affects search behavior, 
there is no guarantee that the job finding rate can increase much for those 
affected by the cut, particularly if there are few vacancies and many 
unemployed, as was the situation in Sweden around 1996. Where is the 
employer in the process, the guy who decides who is hired? 
When vacancies are very few in relation to the number of unemployed 
looking for work, the unemployed can be seen as queuing in front of the 
hiring employer. The unemployed can try to get ahead towards the front of 
the queue or he can slip backwards or freely let others pass. The change 
induced by the benefit cut could be seen as a change in queuing behavior.  
One would expect that those without unemployment insurance would try 
hard to get up in front while those with insurance would not need to behave 
out of line unless one’s household economy is already in the red or has no 
margin left.
6 If the benefit level is lowered substantially for the insured one 
would expect that those with the lowered benefits would forge ahead being 
 
4 Swedish studies of labour supply effects for men give elasticities around 0.1 for prime 
age men and a little higher for women, as reviewed in Agell et al (1995).  Blomquist et 
al (2001) find a net increase of about 2 per cent in average desired hours of married 
prime-age males comparing the 1980 system with 1991. 1980 is the year with 
historically high marginal tax rates and 1991 the year with the lowest rates in the last 
decades. 
 
5 Selén (2002) uses the Swedish Ministry of Finance tax simulation model and data for 
1995. His calculations indicate that the five percentage points cut in the unemployment 
insurance affected the disposable income of the unemployed, who were exposed to the 
5-percent benefit cut, by only 1.2 per cent on average because of the various compen-
sations. Even for those with the longest unemployment spells the 5-percentage point cut 
was reduced to only a 3.4 percent lowering of the disposable income.  
 
6 The job finding rate is indeed higher and episode duration shorter among the non-
insured controlling for demographic and human capital differences. 
9  
 less willing to let others pass. They may be able to get ahead in the queue 
of jobseekers but will that necessarily increase the job finding rate?  
When vacancies are scarce in relation to the number of unemployed 
looking for work, it is the employers’ market and the employer’s criteria 
that determine who gets the vacant job. The employer with a vacancy is 
likely to select the potentially most productive for the vacant job, not 
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E x i t - c o d e s 1236 1 1 1236111236 1 1 123611
Reformeffect -0,006 0,033 -0,187 0,223 0,027 0,150 0,947 0,836 0,372 0,183 0,754 0,004
Reform (after jan 1996) -0,430 -0,021 -0,079 -0,364 0,184 -0,184 0,000 0,864 0,600 0,012 0,016 0,000
Testgroup with 5 percentage cut -0,366 -0,205 0,027 -0,188 0,180 -0,157 0,000 0,039 0,785 0,088 0,002 0,000
Testgroup with 1-4 % cut -0,030 0,052 0,352 -0,216 0,061 0,009 0,619 0,672 0,004 0,164 0,417 0,815
Sex (momen) -0,650 -0,547 -1,183 -0,454 0,355 -0,240 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Age in years in 1995 -0,012 0,000 0,004 -0,035 -0,005 -0,008 0,000 0,991 0,482 0,000 0,048 0,000
Nordic (not Swedish) -0,145 -0,070 -0,244 0,059 0,016 -0,067 0,231 0,773 0,388 0,780 0,881 0,328
Non-Nordic -0,680 -0,879 -0,732 0,060 -0,449 -0,482 0,000 0,003 0,031 0,684 0,000 0,000
Cohabitant 0,117 -0,152 0,148 -0,277 0,063 0,045 0,042 0,194 0,231 0,031 0,243 0,191
Married 0,253 0,175 0,381 -0,182 0,050 0,123 0,000 0,063 0,001 0,047 0,220 0,000
15 years old or younger -0,268 -0,441 -0,285 -0,106 -0,130 -0,199 0,000 0,000 0,003 0,245 0,001 0,000
16 years or older 0,222 0,038 0,125 -0,270 0,144 0,146 0,001 0,785 0,356 0,134 0,028 0,000
9 years or less -0,185 0,113 0,929 -0,485 0,140 -0,049 0,398 0,825 0,194 0,079 0,552 0,706
2 years in high school -0,052 0,242 0,738 -0,510 0,359 0,071 0,812 0,635 0,302 0,063 0,125 0,585
3 years in high school -0,002 0,170 0,448 -0,692 0,267 0,009 0,993 0,742 0,536 0,016 0,260 0,948
1-3 years of university 0,028 0,180 0,169 -0,364 0,332 0,055 0,899 0,728 0,817 0,205 0,162 0,681
4 or more years of university 0,559 0,571 0,578 -0,316 0,246 0,296 0,012 0,275 0,434 0,291 0,311 0,028
None 0,444 0,701 0,938 -0,072 0,615 0,453 0,009 0,078 0,073 0,734 0,000 0,000
Some 0,626 0,983 1,261 -0,052 0,833 0,652 0,000 0,011 0,013 0,794 0,000 0,000
Long 0,803 1,007 1,432 0,030 0,879 0,752 0,000 0,008 0,004 0,877 0,000 0,000
Unemployment rate 0,029 -0,704 7,348 3,492 -3,765 -0,652 0,970 0,673 0,000 0,029 0,000 0,162
Dummies for region and quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Per cent censored out of 18 429 81,8 95,5 96,1 95,6 79,8 48,8
With covariates 59500 14317 12406 13162 66771 168547
Without covariates 60749 14776 13223 13443 67388 169579
Education:
Experience in the wanted job:






Table A1. Estimates and p-values for different exit-codes from unemployment to work
Estimates: p-values according to asymptotic standard errors:
Design variables:
Exit code 1 = to regular permanent job
Exit code 2 = to regular temporary job
Exit code 3 = to previous employer
Exit code 6 = to job but type of job not known




Exit codes 1 1+2 12+3 123+6 1236+11 1+11 1 1+2 12+3 123+6 1236+1 1+11
Reform effect -0,006 0,018 -0,009 0,080 0,150 0,173 0,947 0,821 0,906 0,230 0,004 0,004
Reform (after Jan 1996) -0,430 -0,342 -0,308 -0,342 -0,184 -0,185 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Testgroup with 5 % cut -0,366 -0,336 -0,287 -0,290 -0,157 -0,160 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Testgroup with 1-4 % cut -0,030 -0,015 0,043 0,010 0,009 -0,019 0,619 0,778 0,386 0,840 0,815 0,691
Sex (women) -0,650 -0,629 -0,701 -0,660 -0,240 -0,104 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Age in years in 1995 -0,012 -0,009 -0,007 -0,011 -0,008 -0,008 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000
Nordic (not Swedish) -0,145 -0,135 -0,139 -0,112 -0,067 -0,067 0,231 0,213 0,167 0,219 0,328 0,396
Non-Nordic -0,680 -0,715 -0,721 -0,494 -0,482 -0,567 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Cohabitant 0,117 0,061 0,075 0,022 0,045 0,093 0,042 0,240 0,118 0,615 0,191 0,019
Married 0,253 0,237 0,258 0,192 0,123 0,132 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
15 years old or younger -0,268 -0,305 -0,303 -0,274 -0,199 -0,175 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
16 years or older 0,222 0,184 0,178 0,140 0,146 0,186 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,007 0,000 0,000
9 years or less -0,185 -0,127 0,002 -0,143 -0,049 -0,027 0,398 0,527 0,990 0,364 0,706 0,867
2 years of high school -0,052 0,005 0,075 -0,097 0,071 0,160 0,812 0,979 0,698 0,537 0,585 0,316
3 years of high school -0,002 0,031 0,059 -0,140 0,009 0,133 0,993 0,880 0,763 0,378 0,948 0,410
1-3 years of university 0,028 0,062 0,061 -0,099 0,055 0,176 0,899 0,763 0,756 0,535 0,681 0,278
4 or more years of university 0,559 0,569 0,574 0,341 0,296 0,417 0,012 0,005 0,004 0,034 0,028 0,011
None 0,444 0,486 0,532 0,339 0,453 0,538 0,009 0,002 0,000 0,005 0,000 0,000
Some 0,626 0,688 0,750 0,514 0,652 0,745 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Long 0,803 0,834 0,898 0,656 0,752 0,846 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Unemployment rate 0,029 -0,017 1,082 1,444 -0,652 -1,959 0,970 0,981 0,098 0,017 0,162 0,000
Dummies for region & quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Per cent censored out of 18 42 81,8 77,3 73,4 69,1 48,8 61,6
With covariates 59500 74074 86908 100478 168547 127422
Without covariates 60749 75525 88747 102191 169579 128137
Table A2. Estimates and p-values for different combinations of exit-codes from unemployment to "work"
Estimates: p-values according to asymptotic standard errors:
Experience in the wanted job:
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